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Abstract
We investigate the ﬁrst order predicate logic of probability and establish the game
theoretic tools to prove that this language does not support unnesting of the prob-
ability operator. This is contrasted with the probabilistic propositional logic where
an unnesting algorithm exists.
1 Introduction
Classical predicate and propositional logics and their relatives (modal and
temporal logics) were long recognized as the main formal languages to express
properties of systems. It was also obvious that some important properties
cannot be stated in these languages. In particular statements concerning
probability are entirely outside the scope of classical logic, even though they
are needed when dealing with uncertainty, fault tolerance and randomized
systems. Much eﬀort was invested trying to incorporate probability into for-
mal logic. Major contributions are [6,8] and other papers on the subject are
[12,9,3] ([6] contains a good survey and analysis of previous work on predicate
logic of probability). These eﬀorts did not converge to a commonly accepted
probability logic. The logic suggested in [6] is natural, but too strong; it is
wildly undecidable (it is Σ21 complete by [1] even for a single unary predicate).
In [2] a very natural weaker logic is considered, called Logic of Probability.
It allows to state that a statement ϕ has probability larger than some ﬁxed
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(not variable) rational number. The statement ϕ itself may again speak about
probability. It seems obvious (though it is not proved) that the satisﬁability
problem for monadic logic of probability is far simpler than Σ21 complete. Yet
in spite of its naturalness and simplicity the monadic logic of probability is
undecidable [2].
Here we continue to research the expressive power of the logic of probabil-
ity. In particular our aim is to show that the nested use of the probability op-
erator can yield statements that are not expressible without the nesting. This
turns out to be a non trivial question and the answer involves a new variant
of the Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game technic [5,7]. Variants of Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´
games were extensively used for proof of inexpressibility both in predicate and
modal logics [4,11,10,13].
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: In section 2 we deﬁne the
syntax and the semantics of the logic of probability. In section 3 we show that
for propositional logic the power of the probability statement is restricted:
there is an unnesting procedure that replaces every formula of propositional
probability logic by an equivalent formula without nested probability operators
(theorem 1). In section 4 we identify a fragment of monadic predicate logic of
probability that we call simple formulas. These are unnested formulas which
in addition have no quantiﬁers inside the range of a probability operator.
We deﬁne a Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game and prove in theorem 2 that this game
characterizes equivalence of structures with respect to corresponding classes of
simple closed formulas. We use this game characterization in section 5 where
we prove theorem 3: there is a simple closed formula which is not equivalent
to any unnested formula.
2 Logic of probability
We follow Halpern’s presentation of logic of probability [8]. There, arithmetic
operations on probabilities are allowed and probabilities may be variables
which are quantiﬁed. In our setting, we just compare probabilities with ratio-
nal constants.
We consider a vocabulary that consists of a collection Σ of predicate sym-
bols of various arities and constant symbols. Given formulas ϕ and ψ in the
logic, we allow formulas of the form Prob>q(ϕ) and Prob>q(ϕ|ψ), where q
is a rational number which can be read as “the probability of ϕ is greater
than q” and “the probability of ϕ under the condition ψ is greater than q”
respectively.
2.1 Syntax
More formally we deﬁne the syntax as follows. The vocabulary consists of a
set of deterministic predicate symbols, a set of probabilistic predicate symbols,
individual deterministic constants and individual variables. We also assume
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that rational constants are in the vocabulary.
Formulas:
- Atomic formulas are of the form R(t1, . . . , tk), where R is a (determinis-
tic or probabilistic) predicate symbol of arity k and t1, . . . , tk are individuals
(variables or constants).
- If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are formulas then (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) and ¬ϕ1 are formulas.
- If ϕ is a formula then ∃ xϕ , where x is an individual variable, is a
formula.
- If ϕ, ψ are formulas, and q is a rational number then Prob>q(ϕ) and
Prob>q(ϕ | ψ) are formulas.
Conjunction (ϕ1∧ϕ2), implication (ϕ1 → ϕ2), universal quantiﬁcation ∀ x
are deﬁned as usual, using disjunction, negation and existential quantiﬁer.
Expressions like Prob<q, Prob≤q, Prob≥q, Prob=q can be syntactically de-
ﬁned in terms of Prob>p, using negation and modiﬁed bounds on probability.
For example, we deﬁne Prob<p(ϕ) as Prob>(1−p)(¬ϕ).
2.2 Semantics
First we recall some basic notions from probability theory.
A probability space is a triple (Ω,∆, µ) consisting of a non empty set Ω,
a σ-algebra ∆ of its subsets called the measurable sets (representing random
events in probability context), and a probability measure µ : ∆ → [0, 1] (the
probability of each event). The σ-algebra ∆ includes Ω itself and is closed
under complementation and countable union. The probability measure µ :
∆→ [0, 1] satisﬁes µ(Ω) = 1 and is countably additive.
Probabilistic predicates are interpreted as random predicates. Given a
domain U and a probability space (Ω,∆, µ) a random (or stochastic) predicate
P of arity k is a function from Ω× Uk to Bool = {true, false} such that for
any ﬁxed u1, . . . , uk ∈ U the set {ω ∈ Ω : P (ω, u1, . . . , uk)} is measurable.
A probabilistic structure for the vocabulary described above is a tuple
(〈U , δ〉, 〈Ω,∆, µ〉, π), where
– 〈U , δ〉 is a ﬁrst-order structure with universe U , and δ assigns a relation
over U of the appropriate arity to each deterministic 4 predicate symbol and
assigns an element of U to each individual constant;
– 〈Ω,∆, µ〉 is a probabilistic space;
– π assigns to each probabilistic predicate symbol P of arity k a random
predicate π(P ) : Ω× Uk → Bool.
Deﬁne a valuation ν to be a function which assigns to each individual
variable an element of U .
Given a probabilistic structure M = (〈U , δ〉, 〈Ω,∆, µ〉, π), an element ω ∈
4 Sometimes deterministic predicates are called rigid predicates
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Ω and a valuation ν we proceed by induction to associate with every formula
ϕ a truth value, writing M, ν, ω |= ϕ if the value true is associated with ϕ by
M, ν, ω:
(S1) M, ν, ω |= R(t1, . . . , tk) for a deterministic predicate symbol R of
arity k and individual variables or constants t1, . . . , tk iﬀ δ(R)(a1, . . . , ak) is
true, where ai = ν(ti) if ti is a variable and ai = δ(ti) if ti is a constant name.
(S2) M, ν, ω |= P (t1, . . . , tk) for a probabilistic predicate P of arity k iﬀ
π(P )(ω, a1, . . . , ak) is true, where ai = ν(ti) if ti is a variable and ai = δ(ti) if
ti is a constant name.
(S3) Quantiﬁers over individual variables and Boolean connectors are
treated as usually.
(S4) M, ν, ω |= Prob>q(ϕ) iﬀ µ({ω′ ∈ Ω : M, ν, ω′ |= ϕ}) > q, that is iﬀ
the set of all ω′ for which M, ν, ω′ |= ϕ holds has a measure greater than q.
(S5)M, ν, ω |= Prob>q(ϕ|ψ) iﬀ µ{ω′ ∈ Ω : M, ν, ω′ |= (ϕ∧ψ)} > q·µ{ω′ ∈
Ω : M, ν, ω′ |= ψ}, i. e. the conditional probability of ϕ under ψ is greater
than q.
Remark that (S4) is a particular case of (S5) when ψ = true.
The semantics is well deﬁned only if the sets that appear in (S4) and (S5)
are measurable. From now on we assume that
(Countability Assumption) The domain U of probabilistic structures is
countable.
The following propositions are easily proved by induction on the structure
of formulas [2] :
Proposition 2.1 Under Countability Assumption the sets that appear in (S4)
and (S5) are measurable, and the semantics is well deﬁned.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that two valuations ν1 and ν2 agree on the free
variables of a formula ϕ. Then M, ν1, ω |= ϕ iﬀ M, ν2, ω |= ϕ.
Proposition 2.3 If all the occurrences of probabilistic predicates in a formula
ϕ are in the scope of some operator Prob then M, ν, ω1 |= ϕ iﬀ M, ν, ω2 |= ϕ
for every ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω. In particular, for any formula ψ we have M, ν, ω1 |=
Prob>q(ψ) iﬀ M, ν, ω2 |= Prob>q(ψ).
3 On nesting of probability operators for propositional
logic
Our main interest lies in predicate logic. But we start by showing that for
propositional logic the use of the probability operator has only restricted
power; nesting one occurrence in the scope of another one does not add extra
power to the language. We outline the analogue (yet simpler) syntax and
semantics of the Propositional Probability Logic (henceforth PPL).
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Formulas are:
• Elementary formulas are true, false or a symbol from a set Vd of determin-
istic Boolean variables or a symbol from a set Vp of probabilistic Boolean
variables.
• If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are formulas then (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) and ¬ϕ1 are formulas.
• If ϕ, ψ are formulas, and q is a rational number then Prob>q(ϕ) and
Prob>q(ϕ | ψ) are formulas.
Given a probability space (Ω,∆, µ), a structure M is deﬁned through a
pair of functions Mp : Ω × Vp −→ Bool and Md : Vd −→ Bool. The truth
value of any formula is deﬁned inductively similarly to (S3)-(S5).
Theorem 3.1 Every PPL-formula is equivalent to an unnested formula.
Proof. We show ﬁrst that if Ψ is a boolean combination of formulas
A1, . . . ,An of PPL where An has the form Prob>q(. . . ), and if α0, α1 are
obtained from Ψ replacing An by false and true respectively, then for every
formula ϕ,
(1). Prob>p(ϕ|Ψ) is equivalent to
(Prob>p(ϕ|α1) ∧An) ∨ (Prob>p(ϕ|α0) ∧ ¬An),
(2). Prob>q(Ψ|ϕ) is equivalent to
(Prob>q(α1|ϕ) ∧ An) ∨ (Prob>q(α0|ϕ) ∧ ¬An).
This is true because for every structure M and ω ∈ Ω
If M,ω |= An then M,ω |= Prob>p(ϕ|Ψ) iﬀ M,ω |= Prob>p(ϕ|α1) and
M,ω |= (Prob>p(ϕ|α1) ∧ An) ∨ (Prob>p(ϕ|α0) ∧ ¬An) iﬀ
M,ω |= Prob>p(ϕ|α1)
(the second claim is proved in a similar way).
The theorem is now proved by induction on the nesting depth of the oper-
ator Prob. We use (1) and (2) to pull out the innermost occurrences of Prob
reducing the rank to one for which the induction assumption holds. ✷
4 Unnested formulas and their Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´
game
We turn next to nested and unnested closed formulas in ﬁrst order predicate
logic of probability. For our method to work we must be careful to require
that the formulas have another property beside unnestedness. Later we will
show that this extra property does not restrict us:
Deﬁnition 1 A formula is pseudoatomic if it is either atomic or of the form
Prob>q(ψ|ϕ) where ψ and ϕ are quantiﬁer-free and Prob free. A closed for-
mula (i.e., a formula without free variables) is called simple if it is constructed
from pseudoatomic formulas by Boolean connectives and quantiﬁers.
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Thus in a simple formula there is no nesting of the operator Prob and no
quantiﬁer is in the scope of the operator Prob.
Next we deﬁne two kinds of equivalence relation on the class of structures.
In the ﬁrst case two structures will be equivalent to each other if they cannot
be distinguished by a simple formula with quantiﬁer depth n. In the second
case they will be equivalent if the spoiler (ﬁrst player) has no winning strategy
in an appropriate game.
Deﬁnition 2 Let M0 and M1 be two structures over a given vocabulary and let
ω0 (respectively ω1) be an element of the probabilistic space of M0 (respectively
of M1). We write (M0, ω0) ≡n (M1, ω1) if for any simple sentence ϕ with
quantiﬁer depth ≤ n we have M0, ω0 |= ϕ iﬀ M1, ω1 |= ϕ.
An Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ k-round game on the structures (M0, ω0) and
(M1, ω1) is played by two players Spoiler and Duplicator, and it involves k
moves for each player; Spoiler plays ﬁrst. He chooses one of the structures,
say Mi and an element in that structure. Duplicator responds by choosing
an element in the other model, i. e. in M1−i, which he believes ‘matches’ the
element chosen by Spoiler. This pair of moves completes one round of the
game. The game is repeated for k rounds. Spoiler may or may not alternate
the model where he chooses the next element from, and Duplicator always
reacts by choosing an element in the other model. When the game is over
there are two sequences of elements: a1, · · · , ak in M0 and b1, · · · , bk in M1.
Duplicator is the winner if for any unnested quantiﬁer free formula
ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) with at most k free variables the truth value of ϕ(a1, . . . , ak)
evaluated in M0 at ω0 equals to the value of ϕ(b1, . . . , bk) evaluated in M1 at
ω1. Otherwise Spoiler wins.
In particular if Duplicator is the winner then for any quantiﬁer-free for-
mulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) and ψ(x1, . . . , xk) with at most k free variables the truth
value of Prob<q
(
ϕ(a1, . . . , ak) ψ(a1, . . . , ak)
)
evaluated in M0 at ω0 equals
to the value of Prob<q
(
ϕ(b1, . . . , bk) ψ(b1, . . . , bk)
)
evaluated in M1 at ω1.
A winning strategy, for either player, is a strategy which when followed,
guarantees winning, no matter what the other player plays.
Deﬁnition 3 Let M0 and M1 be two structures over a given vocabulary and let
ω0 (respectively ω1) be an element of the probabilistic space of M0 (respectively
of M1). We write (M0, ω0) ≡Gn (M1, ω1) if Duplicator has a winning strategy
in the n-round Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game.
The following theorem enables us to use Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games to
prove that two structures cannot be distinguished by simple (closed) formulas
with a predetermined quantiﬁer depth n:
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness) Let M0 and M1 be structures over some vocab-
ulary. If (M0, ω0) ≡Gn (M1, ω1) then (M0, ω0) ≡n (M1, ω1).
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Proof. We shall prove the claim by induction on n for all vocabularies simul-
taneously.
For n = 0 this follows from the deﬁnitions.
Assume next that the claim holds for n and that Duplicator has a winning
strategy in the n + 1 game. For contradiction we assume that there is a
shortest simple formula of quantiﬁer depth n+ 1 that is true in one structure
and not in the other. The shortest counterexample cannot be a disjunction or
a negation which necessarily involves a subformula that is a counterexample.
Hence there is a counterexample ∃xϕ(x) which holds (say) in M0 at ω0 while
∀x¬ϕ(x) holds in M1 at ω1. We let now Spoiler choose an element a0 in M0
for which M0, ω0 |= ϕ(a0). Duplicator follows by choosing an element b0 in
M1. We now enrich the vocabulary by an individual constant c and interpret
this constant as a0 in M0 and as b0 in M1. Since Duplicator had a strategy for
n+1 rounds, starting with the response of b0 to the move of a0 it is clear that
he still has a winning strategy in the n-round game in the enriched vocabulary
and models with c interpreted by a0 and b0. Now M0, ω0 |= ϕ[c/x] and hence
by induction assumption M1, ω1 |= ϕ[c/x] which contradicts the choice of ϕ.
✷
Remark 4.2 (Incompleteness) Unfortunately, the converse direction of
Theorem 4.1 fails. In the full paper, we will provide an example of two struc-
tures which are ≡n-equivalent but not ≡Gn -equivalent.
5 The expressive power of nesting
We are almost ready to prove that there is no unnesting procedure in predicate
probability logic. First a lemma:
Lemma 5.1 (i) Let L be the ﬁrst order predicate language (without prob-
ability) with the single unary predicate P and with no equality symbol.
Let Σ be the class of all structures that have at least one element satisfy-
ing P and at least one element satisfying ¬P . Then every L-formula is
equivalent over Σ to a formula without quantiﬁers.
(ii) Let L be the ﬁrst order predicate language of probability with the single
unary predicate P and with no equality symbol. Let Σ be the class of all
probabilistic structures that have at least one element satisfying P and
at least one element satisfying ¬P for each ω ∈ Ω. Then over Σ every
unnested formula is equivalent to a simple formula.
Proof. Let ϕ be a basic formula, i.e, True, False or a conjunction of atoms
and negation of atoms in which every variable occurs at most once. Then in
Σ the formula ∃xϕ is equivalent to the formula ϕ with the atom P (x) (or
¬P (x)) removed, let us denote the resulting formula ϕ−x.
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It is easy to see that every quantiﬁer free formula is equivalent to a dis-
junction of basic formulas and that for such a disjunction ψ = ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn
the formula ∃xψ is equivalent in Σ to ϕ−x1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕ−xn .
It follows that if θ is equivalent to a quantiﬁer free formula (and therefore
also ¬θ) then ∃xθ (and also ∀xθ) is equivalent to a quantiﬁer free formula.
This proves part (i). Part (ii) follows trivially from part 1. ✷
In contrast to the propositional case, nesting of probabilistic operators
increases the expressive power for ﬁrst-order logic. We are now ready our
main result.
Theorem 5.2 No unnested formula is equivalent to
Prob=3/4
[ ∃t(Prob=1/2[P (t)] ∧ P (t))
]
. (1)
Proof. We show a slightly more general statement. Let Ψ be the formula
Prob=η
[ ∃t(Prob=θ[P (t)] ∧ P (t))
]
,
where 0 < θ < η < 1 and 2η = θ + 1. Then there is no unnested formula
which is equivalent to Ψ.
Assume that Ψ is suspected of being equivalent to some unnested formula Θ
over the class Σ of all probabilistic structures that have at least one element
satisfying P and at least one element satisfying ¬P for each ω ∈ Ω. By the
lemma we may assume that Θ is simple. Assume now that the quantiﬁer
depth of Θ is k. We build two structures M0 and M1 with the same ﬁnite
probability space Ω = {ω0, ω1, · · ·ω2k+1} such that
(i) both M1 and M2 are in the class Σ, and M1 satisﬁes Ψ while M2 does
not.
(ii) (M0, ω0) ≡Gk (M1, ω0), so that by theorem 2 either both satisfy Θ or none
of the two satisﬁes Θ.
Thus Ψ is not equivalent to Θ.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 represent the two structures.
We assume that k ≥ 1. Both domains have 2k+ 1 elements (denoted here
by 0, 1, · · · , 2k). Ω has 2k + 2 elements with probability as speciﬁed on the
left column. Rationals θ,η and ε are chosen so that (k + 1)ε = η − θ + ε and
kε = 1− η. Thus η − θ = 1− η or equivalently 2η = 1 + θ, and if η = 3
4
then
θ = 1
2
.
Each horizontal line represents the domain corresponding to a particular
ωi. The marking ∗ means that the element i corresponding to this column
satisﬁes P in the domain corresponding to this row. There are two types of
elements: elements of the ﬁrst type satisfy P in two of the domains and they
satisfy P with probability θ. We call them θ-elements. The other elements
are ε-elements which satisfy P in one domain only and their probability of
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Fig. 1. Structure M0.
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0 1 k−1 k k+1
.  .  .
.  .  .
.  .  .
.  .  .
.  .  .
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*
*
*
* *
*
*
*
ωk+1ε
.  .  .
.  .  .
2k
.  .  .
.  .  .
.  .  .
.  .  .
.  .  .ωk+2
Prob: Ω:
*
. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .
.  .  . .  .  .ω2k+1
ε
ε
.
 
 
.
 
 
.
1−η
Fig. 2. Structure M1.
satisfying P is ε. M0 has k + 1 θ-elements and k ε-elements. M1 has k
θ-elements and k + 1 ε-elements. Note that the two structures satisfy the
condition of lemma 1.
The formula Prob=θ[P (t)] holds for t = 0, ..., k inM0 and for t = 0, ..., k−1
in M1. It follows that ∃ t (Prob=θ[P (t)] ∧ P (t)) holds in k + 1 lines of M0
and only in k lines in M1. We conclude that the formula (1) is true on M0
(Figure 1) and false on M1 (Figure 2).
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It remains to show that Duplicator has a winning strategy for the k-
round Ehrenfeucht–Fra¨ısse´ game between (M0, ω0) and (M1, ω0). Assume that
0 ≤ i < k and that a1, · · · , ai in M0 and b1, · · · , bi in M1 were already chosen
according to the rules of the game. Assume that Spoiler chooses ai+1 in M0
(the dual case is treated similarly). If for some j ≤ i ai+1 = aj thenDuplicator
chooses bi+1 = bj . Else if ai+1 is an element of type θ (satisfying P in two
domains), Duplicator chooses an element not yet chosen inM1 of type θ. This
is always possible, as there are at least k elements of type θ in either structure.
Finally, if ai+1 is a new ε element then bi+1 is chosen as a new ε-element in
M1. This is possible since there are at least k ε-elements in each structure. It
is clear that with this strategy:
(i) For every i ≤ k
M0, ω0 |= P (ai) iﬀ M0, ω0 |= P (bi)
(ii) After a simple rearrangement of ω1, ω2 · · ·ω2k+1 for M1, ai and bi satisfy
P in the same lines. I.e, for every i ≤ k and for every j ≤ 2k + 1
M0, ωj |= P (ai) iﬀ M0, ωj |= P (bi)
.
Thus the sequences a1, · · · , ak and b1, · · · , bk are isomorphic modulo the
order rearrangement. Since the rearrangement does not change the truth value
of pseudoatomic statements we conclude that (M0, ω0) and (M1, ω0) satisfy the
same pseudoatomic statements. ✷
6 Conclusion
Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games were used to prove that nested probability state-
ments are more expressive than unnested statement. This is a key observation
when studying a language and examining its expressive power. We would have
liked to sharpen the results and claim a hierarchy of languages with increasing
expressive power, according to the depth of the Prob nesting. Unfortunately
the particular form of Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games that we used does not gen-
eralize easily to non simple formulas. This leaves open the questions:
• Is there a proper hierarchy of languages according to the depth of nested
Prob operators allowed?
• What is the proper Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game to use in the analysis of prob-
ability logic?
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